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WHERE HASKER’S ANTI-MOLINIST  
ARGUMENT GOES WRONG
Arthur J. Cunningham
This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument (1999, 
reiterated in 2011) against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s 
argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded 
as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been 
to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle 
knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particu-
lar, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof 
of the “power entailment principle.” The paper closes with a critical examina-
tion of ideas about free will and the past history of the world that might be 
supposed to support Hasker’s conviction that Molinism is incompatible with 
a libertarian view of free will.
1. Introduction
William Hasker presents his “new anti-Molinist argument” as a reductio 
of the Molinist theory of divine providence.1 The argument centers on 
the question of whether human beings have a certain sort of power over 
the counterfactuals of freedom that characterize their own actions: is it in 
our power to bring about the counterfactuals of freedom about ourselves, 
in a special sense of “bring about” that Hasker defines?2 He argues that, 
on the one hand, it is a consequence of Molinists’ acknowledged views 
about counterfactuals of freedom that, insofar as we human beings have 
the power to act otherwise than as we do, we do have the power to bring 
about the truth of certain counterfactuals of freedom about ourselves. On 
the other hand, Molinists affirm that God’s creative decision to actualize 
a particular world is informed by his knowledge of the counterfactuals 
of freedom; Hasker argues that this feature of Molinism has a previously 
unrecognized implication, namely that “the counterfactuals of freedom 
are, or are entailed by, part of the causal history of the world.”3 But if 
they are entailed by the world’s history, then given Hasker’s definition 
1Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Hasker restates the argument in “The (Non-)
Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals.”
2When I use the term “counterfactuals of freedom” in this paper, I am referring exclusively 
to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (as opposed to counterfactuals of divine freedom).
3Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 291.
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of “bring about,” no one could possibly bring about the truth of any of 
these counterfactuals. And so Molinism involves a contradiction: human 
agents both do and do not have the power to bring about the truth of the 
counterfactuals of freedom about themselves.
I argue that this attempted refutation of Molinism fails. By Hasker’s 
own lights, the linchpin of the argument is his claim that if Molinism is 
true, the counterfactuals of freedom are entailed by the world’s past history. He 
goes so far as to say that Molinism is refuted if and only if this claim is 
true. But this is a mistake. The claim in question is essential to the argu-
ment for one half of Hasker’s intended contradiction. But what neither 
Hasker nor his Molinist interlocutors have realized, and what I will show 
here, is that the same claim is fatal to his argument for the other half of the 
intended contradiction. The result is that whether the counterfactuals of 
freedom are entailed by the world’s past history or not, Hasker’s argument 
fails to yield a genuine contradiction for the Molinist.
2. Why Bringing about a Counterfactual of Freedom is Impossible
Hasker considers a case in which an agent A freely does z in circumstances 
c. He argues that the Molinist is committed to a pair of contradictory 
statements:4
(7) It is in A’s power to bring it about that (C → ~Z).
(9) It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C → ~Z).
Here “(C → ~Z)” symbolizes the counterfactual of freedom if A were in 
circumstances c, then A would (freely) not do z. (The symbol “→” symbolizes 
the subjunctive conditional.)
I will examine Hasker’s argument for (7) in the next section, but here is 
the basic rationale behind it. Suppose that A is in circumstances c, and that 
A is just about to choose, freely, whether to do z or not. According to the 
libertarian view of free will that Molinists adhere to, this means that both 
of the alternatives—doing z, and refraining from doing z—are genuinely 
in A’s power. But that which she does determines which of two contrary 
counterfactuals of freedom, (C → Z) or (C → ~Z), is true of her; hence in 
having both the power to do z and the power to refrain she has the power 
to determine which of these counterfactuals is true. Now by hypothesis A 
chooses to do z, so (C → Z) is true of her; nevertheless, she has the (unex-
ercised) power to refrain and thereby to ensure the truth of the opposed 
(and in fact false) counterfactual (C → ~Z). The burden of Hasker’s argu-
ment for (7) is to show that A’s having the power to act so as to ensure the 
truth of (C → ~Z) really does entail that A has the power to bring it about 
that (C → ~Z), in Hasker’s stipulated sense of “bring about.” I will show 
in section 3 below that his argument does not succeed.
4Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 292; “The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Coun-
terfactuals,” 32, 34.
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My task in this section is to examine Hasker’s case for (9). This can be 
divided into two stages. The first stage consists of an argument that, given 
the Molinist theory of middle knowledge, the counterfactuals of freedom 
are entailed by the world’s past history; the second stage is an argument 
for (9) with this alleged consequence of Molinism as its key premise.
The argument of the first stage is based on the Molinist theory of middle 
knowledge and its role in creation. According to Molinism, God’s middle 
knowledge, which includes knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom, 
plays an essential role in guiding the divine decision about precisely 
which world to actualize. Given that Molinist thesis, Hasker argues, God’s 
middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the past history of the 
world. He invokes as a premise here the “extremely plausible” assump-
tion that “a fact is a part of the world’s history if it has had causal consequences 
prior to the present time.”5 According to this assumption, God’s creative de-
cision must be classified as part of the world’s past history; so too, Hasker 
implies, must God’s middle knowledge, in virtue of the crucial role this 
knowledge plays in that decision. So assuming that the Molinist thesis is 
true, God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom is part of the past 
history of the world. And therefore all true counterfactuals of freedom 
are entailed by the world’s history, since God’s knowledge of these coun-
terfactuals entails that they are in fact true. Hasker concludes that it is a 
consequence of Molinism that the counterfactuals of freedom are entailed 
by the past history of the world.6
The significance of this alleged consequence of Molinism has to with 
the way it interacts with Hasker’s definition of what it is for an agent to 
bring about a given state of affairs. He defines this notion as follows:
(BA) A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be the case that X, 
and (X & H) ⇒ Y, and ~(H ⇒ Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the 
world prior to its coming to be the case that X.7
5Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 294 (italics in original).
6In an earlier article, Hasker argues that the Molinist thesis that God’s creative decision is 
informed by his knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom is, if true at all, necessarily true. See 
Hasker, “Middle Knowledge,” 235n14. Presumably he would say the same for the two other 
premises that figure in the argument sketched in this paragraph (namely, that a fact is part of 
the world’s history if it has had causal consequences prior to the present time, and that God’s 
knowing that some proposition is true entails that it is true). There is then some basis for 
regarding each of these premises as having an implicit “necessarily” attached to it. But what 
follows validly from necessarily true premises is itself necessarily true; hence there is some 
basis for regarding the conclusion Hasker draws here, that all true counterfactuals of freedom 
are entailed by the past history of the world, as also having an implicit “necessarily” attached 
to it. This is significant because, as we will see, Hasker’s argument for (9) requires the conclu-
sion he draws here to be understood precisely as having that modal operator attached to it.
 Let me note that, in advocating this strategy for upgrading the modal force of the con-
clusion he draws here, I am merely reading into Hasker’s latest “bring about” argument a 
strategy he himself has used, in connection with one of his earlier arguments, to close a gap 
in his reasoning similar to one that threatens here. See ibid., 226–227.
7Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 291 (italics added); restated in “The (Non-)
Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” 31. Hasker adds in a footnote that “the symbol ‘⇒’ 
expresses strict (broadly logical, or metaphysical) necessitation.”
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To adapt a statement from Hasker,8 the idea is that an agent brings about 
a given state of affairs just in case she performs an action such that her 
performing that action, together with the world’s past history, entails the 
state of affairs in question, whereas the world’s history by itself does not 
entail that state of affairs.
We are now in a position to state the second stage of the argument for 
(9). As Hasker notes,
According to (BA), if the agent is to bring about the truth of a counterfactual 
(C → X ), it must not be the case that (H ⇒ (C → X )). That is to say, the coun-
terfactual must not be entailed by the world’s past history.9
But as we have just seen, Hasker maintains that it is a consequence of 
Molinist views about middle knowledge that all (true) counterfactuals of 
freedom are entailed by the past history of the world. So assuming the 
truth of Molinism,
‘H ’ does entail ‘C → X ’, where ‘C → X ’ is a true counterfactual of freedom. 
But if this is so, then we created free agents do not bring about the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom about us; there is no possible world in which we do 
this. Now what we do in no possible world, is impossible for us to do, and 
does not lie within our power to do.10
Therefore, it is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of any 
counterfactuals of freedom about her. And from this, (9) follows.
Hasker’s reasoning here reveals something important about the pre-
cise content of the crucial premise in it, the premise the counterfactuals of 
freedom are entailed by the past history of the world. From this premise and 
the definition (BA), Hasker concludes in the passage quoted above not 
only that we created free agents do not in fact bring about the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom about ourselves, but that “there is no possible 
world in which we do this.” It is this impossibility claim that licenses the 
further conclusion that we lack the power to bring about the truth of any 
counterfactual of freedom about us. But this impossibility claim does not 
follow from (BA) and a premise which asserts only that the past history 
of the actual world entails every counterfactual of freedom that is in fact 
true. (All that follows from that combination is that no agent does in fact 
bring about any counterfactual of freedom.) On the other hand, the de-
sired impossibility claim does follow from (BA) together with the premise 
that in every possible world the world’s history entails all true (in that world) 
counterfactuals of freedom.
The point is that, in order to close what would otherwise be a gap in 
Hasker’s argument, we must understand the crucial (allegedly Molinist) 
premise the counterfactuals of freedom are entailed by the past history of the 
world as the metaphysical principle
8Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 293.
9Hasker, “The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” 32.
10Ibid., 33.
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(PAST) Necessarily, all true counterfactuals of freedom are entailed by 
the past history of the world.11
We may restate (PAST), somewhat more perspicuously, as follows:
For any counterfactual of freedom (C → X) and any possible world W, 
if (C → X) is true in W then [HW ⇒ (C → X)],
where “HW” represents the history of W. Since the converse of this second 
formulation is trivially true—i.e., if [HW ⇒ (C → X)], then (C → X) is true 
in W—a third formulation is logically equivalent to the preceding two:
For any counterfactual of freedom (C → X) and any possible world W, 
(C → X) is true in W if and only if [HW ⇒ (C → X)].
If, as I will henceforth assume, (PAST) is the proper construal of Hask-
er’s crucial (allegedly) Molinist premise, we can reformulate his argument 
for (9) in such a way as to leave no doubt about its validity. Let (C → X) be 
an arbitrary counterfactual of freedom, either true or false. Given (PAST), 
together with Hasker’s definition of “brings about,” it follows immediately 
that it is impossible that agent A should bring about the truth of (C → X):
(1*) For every possible world W, A brings it about that (C → X) in W 
only if: (C → X) is true in W, and HW does not entail (C → X).   
 (from definition (BA)12)
(2*) For every possible world W, (C → X) is true in W if and only if HW 
entails (C → X). (PAST)
(3*) There is no possible world in which A brings it about that 
(C → X). (from (1*) and (2*)) 
The next premise expresses a necessary condition for attributing to an 
agent the power to bring about the truth of a counterfactual of freedom:
(4*) If there is no possible world in which A brings it about that (C → X), 
then it is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C → X). (premise)
(5*) It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C → X).   
 (from (3*) and (4*))
11Hasker himself uses an exactly parallel strategy to close what he acknowledges is a gap 
in one of his earlier “bring about” arguments against Molinism. See note 6 above.
12According to Hasker’s definition (BA), A brings it about that Y is true in world W if and 
only if for some X,
(i) A causes it to be the case that X in W,
(ii) (X & HW) ⇒ Y, and
(iii) ~ (HW ⇒ Y),
where “HW” represents the history of W prior to its coming to be the case that X. If conditions 
(i) and (ii) are jointly satisfied for some X and W, then: by (i), X is true in W; therefore (X & 
HW) is true in W; therefore, by (ii), Y is true in W. And so, if A brings it about that Y in W, then 
by (i) and (ii), Y is true in W, and by (iii), ~ (HW ⇒ Y).
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This conclusion holds for any counterfactual of freedom, true or false; 
therefore it certainly holds for the (false) counterfactual of freedom 
(C → ~Z) at issue in Hasker’s argument. Hence
(9) It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C → ~Z).
The argument is plainly valid, and the two non-Molinist premises (1*) 
and (4*) are above suspicion. (1*) follows directly from Hasker’s stipulated 
definition of “brings about.” And (4*) seems incontrovertible:13 it could 
hardly make sense to attribute to an agent the power to bring about a given 
counterfactual of freedom unless there is a possible action on her part by 
which, were she to perform it, she would bring about the counterfactual of 
freedom in question.14 So I think this argument establishes conclusively that 
if (PAST) is a consequence of Molinism, as Hasker argues, then so is (9).
Of course, this leaves open the question whether (PAST) is, in fact, a 
consequence of Molinist commitments. This is contestable. As we have 
seen, Hasker’s case for (PAST) depends on the assumption that “a fact is 
a part of the world’s history if it has had causal consequences prior to the 
present time.” Hasker assumes, in other words, that if the causal conse-
quences of some fact have existed prior to the present time, then that fact 
itself belongs to the past history of the world. However plausible it might 
seem at first glance, this assumption is hardly uncontroversial. Hasker 
himself acknowledges that proponents of backwards causation will be 
inclined to reject it; more to the point, I think, is that adherents of the view 
that God is timelessly eternal will reject it. Adherents of eternalism have a 
ready counterexample: on the eternalist view, (the fact of?) God’s creative 
act of will does not belong to the past history of the world since this act 
does not take place in time at all, yet effects of this act have existed prior 
to the present time. Now since many Molinists—including Molina him-
self—hold that God is timelessly eternal, many Molinists have principled 
reasons, reasons not based on the Molinist theory of divine providence, 
for rejecting the assumption in question.15 The same reasons will lead 
13Thomas Flint formulates a possible Molinist objection to a principle that is quite similar 
to premise (4*). I discuss Flint’s objection in note 35 below.
14Hasker says something to this effect in one of his earlier “bring about” arguments 
against Molinism. It is, he says, an accepted principle that “It is in an agent’s power to bring 
it about that a given counterfactual of freedom is true, only if its truth would be brought 
about by the agent’s performing the action specified in the consequent of the conditional 
under the conditions specified in the antecedent” (Hasker, “A Refutation of Middle Knowl-
edge,” 548–549). Of course, the agent must also have the power to perform the relevant 
action.
15Thomas Flint raises a different objection, on specifically Molinist grounds, to what he 
characterizes as Hasker’s assumption “that something which has had causal consequences in 
the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past.” See Flint, “A New Anti-Anti-
Molinist Argument,” 302 ff. For his response, see Hasker, “Are Alternative Pasts Plausible?” 
I think it is preferable to avoid using the terminology of “hard facts” about the past, since 
discussions employing that terminology not infrequently run together two distinct issues, 
namely, (a) whether a given fact belongs to the world’s past history, strictly speaking, and 
(b) whether any agent might now have the power to perform an action such that, were he 
to perform it, the given fact would never have been a fact at all. Hasker and Flint agree that 
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them to deny Hasker’s conclusion that God’s middle knowledge in particular 
belongs to the world’s past history. This provides some basis, at least, for 
thinking that Molinism does not entail (PAST).16
But suppose we do not challenge Hasker on this point. Let us simply 
grant, for the sake of argument, that God’s middle knowledge is part of the 
world’s past history, so that (PAST) is true and with it (9). Does Hasker’s 
reductio of Molinism go through? Hasker thinks so: he says that his argu-
ment “succeeds if and only if the counterfactuals of freedom are a part of, 
or are entailed by, the world’s history.”17 But clearly this is correct only if 
his argument for (7), the other half of the contradiction he intends to pin 
on Molinism, is successful. To that argument I now turn.
3. Where Hasker’s Argument Goes Wrong
Hasker makes it clear that in his judgment, it is virtually incontestable that
(7) It is in A’s power to bring it about that (C → ~Z)
is a consequence of Molinist assumptions. His chief Molinist interlocutor, 
Thomas Flint, concurs: “it has never been in dispute that, given Hasker’s 
final account of ‘bringing about’ . . . the Molinist is committed to (7).”18 
The agreement between Hasker and Flint on this point explains why their 
debate over the success of the anti-Molinist argument has been confined 
to a debate over Hasker’s case for (9). But I aim to show that, contrary to 
what both Hasker and Flint suppose, Hasker does not succeed in showing 
that the Molinist is committed to (7).
Before we turn to the details of Hasker’s argument for (7), let me point 
out a reason for viewing the argument with suspicion. As we have seen, 
it follows directly from (PAST) that no one could possibly bring about a 
counterfactual of freedom, in Hasker’s sense of “bring about.” (This is the 
thrust of (1*)–(3*) in section 2 above.) Given that general conclusion, it is 
hard to see how an argument for the conclusion A has the power to bring about 
the counterfactual of freedom (C → ~Z) could go through. Even if A were to 
these issues should not be run together. Hasker notes, “It is one thing to claim that we have 
counterfactual control over some past facts; it is another matter to claim that, in virtue of 
this, those facts are not part of our history” (Hasker, “The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Coun-
terfactuals,” 34). Flint makes a similar point: “We can indeed view facts that have had causal 
consequences as part of our history. . . . But why think that, because something is part of our 
history in this sense of history, it would have been part of our history no matter what we might 
do?” (Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate,” 44n13)
16Hasker could respond by saying that by “past history” he means the causally prior his-
tory of the world rather than its temporally prior history. He could then offer his “extremely 
plausible” assumption not as an assumption but instead as a stipulation about what the 
causally prior history of the world includes. This would allow him to sidestep both the back-
wards causation and the eternalism objections to that assumption. He would, however, still 
have to make the case that God’s middle knowledge is causally prior to events in the created 
order, even though it does not actually contribute causally either to God’s creative act or to 
events in the created order.
17Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 296.
18Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate,” 40.
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ensure the truth of (C → ~Z), by refraining from doing z in circumstances 
c, she would not qualify as bringing about the truth of this counterfactual 
of freedom. For were she to do this, God would always have known that 
(C → ~Z) was true of her, and in that case—since we are supposing that 
God’s middle knowledge is part of the world’s past history—the past his-
tory of the world would entail (C → ~Z). But according to definition (BA), 
A brings it about that (C → ~Z) can be true only if the world’s past history 
does not entail (C → ~Z). Therefore, even if A were to do the sole thing by 
which she could conceivably ensure the truth of (C → ~Z),19 she still would 
not qualify as bringing about its truth, in Hasker’s sense. This makes the 
prospects for an argument that A has the power to bring about (C → ~Z) 
look pretty dim.
Of course, we must remember that Hasker aims to provide a reductio of 
Molinism. That (7) is incompatible with the reasoning just outlined might 
simply serve to highlight the absurdity of Molinism—if the argument for 
(7) goes through. So we cannot conclude that the case for (7) is hopeless 
without examining the details of Hasker’s argument.
Here is how Hasker states the argument for (7):20
(1) Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘C → Z’ is 
true of her, and she freely chooses to do z. (Molinist premise21)
(2) A is in c, and it is in A’s power to refrain from doing z.  
 (From (1) and definition of libertarian freedom)
(3) It is in A’s power to bring it about that: A is in c, and A refrains from 
doing z. (From (2))
(4) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and ‘P’ entails ‘Q’ and ‘Q’ is 
false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q.  
 (Power Entailment Principle)
(5) (A is in c and refrains from doing z) ⇒ (C → ~Z). (Molinist premise)
(6) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that A is in c and refrains from doing 
z, and ‘(C → ~Z)’ is false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that 
(C → ~Z). (From (4), (5))
(7) It is in A’s power to bring it about that (C → ~Z). (From (1), (3), (6))
There are two steps in this argument that I wish to challenge. One is 
premise (4); the other is the inference from (2) to (3). Hasker offers a justi-
fication for both steps, but I will show that neither justification succeeds.
19“How might it be possible for the agent to bring it about that a given counterfactual of 
freedom is true? It would seem that the only possible way in which the agent might do this is 
by performing the action specified in the consequent of the conditional under the conditions 
specified in the antecedent” (Hasker, “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge,” 548).
20Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 292.
21This is a Molinist premise (as Hasker labels it) in the following sense: Molinists hold 
that human beings have free will, and that corresponding to each freely performed action 
is a true counterfactual of freedom. Therefore, Molinists hold that some actions are freely 
performed, and for each such action a premise of this form is true for some A, c, and z.
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Consider first premise (4), Hasker’s “power entailment principle.” 
Hasker contends that this principle is demonstrable, given his definition 
of “bring about,” and he offers the following proof:
According to (BA), if A, by causing it to be the case that X, were to bring it 
about that P, and ‘P’ entails ‘Q’, then by that very same action A would bring it 
about that Q, provided that ~ (H ⇒ Q). But if ‘Q’ is in fact false, it cannot be 
entailed by H, so ‘~ (H ⇒ Q)’ is true. So if A by causing it to be the case that X 
would bring it about that P, and P ⇒ Q and ~ Q, then A by causing it to be the 
case that X would bring it about that Q.
Now suppose that A has the power to bring it about that P by causing it to be 
the case that X. It follows, trivially, that A does have the power to cause it to 
be the case that X. But it was shown above that A’s causing it to be the case 
that X would bring it about that Q—always assuming, of course, that P ⇒ Q 
and ~ Q. Which is to say: If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P and ‘P’ 
entails ‘Q’ and ‘Q’ is false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q. 
Q.E.D.22
The bit of reasoning to scrutinize here occurs within the first half of the 
proof, where Hasker says,
But if ‘Q’ is in fact false, it cannot be entailed by H, so ‘~(H ⇒ Q)’ is true.
Now taken by itself, this reasoning seems perfectly legitimate: sup-
posing that “H” represents the history of the actual world, H is factual, 
and so whatever H entails is true. However, in the first half of the proof, 
where this bit of reasoning occurs, it is not a factual but a counterfactual 
scenario that is under consideration. The aim of this portion of the proof 
is to show that if A were to bring it about that P—something that, by hy-
pothesis, A does not actually do23—A would thereby also bring it about that 
Q. Establishing the truth of this counterfactual requires showing that A 
brings it about that Q is true, not in the actual world, but in the nearest 
possible world W* in which A brings it about that P.24 And that of course 
requires showing that the conditions specified in definition (BA) for the 
truth of A brings it about that Q are satisfied in W*, rather than in the 
actual world.
According to (BA), one necessary condition for the truth of A brings it 
about that Q is that the past history of the world by itself does not entail Q. Obvi-
ously this is what Hasker takes himself to be showing in the line presently 
under scrutiny. But here is the crucial point: to show that this condition is 
satisfied in W*, Hasker must show that the history of W* does not entail Q. 
That is to say, what Hasker needs to establish is not that ~ (H ⇒ Q), where 
“H” represents the history of the actual world, but rather that ~ (H* ⇒ Q), 
22Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 292n5.
23According to the hypothesis of the proof, Q is in fact false, and P entails Q. Hence P is 
in fact false. Since an agent brings it about that P only if P is true, A does not in fact bring it 
about that P.
24For the sake of simplicity, I frame my argument in terms of the simple case where there 
is a unique nearest possible world in which A brings it about that P.
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where “H*” represents the history of W*. Hasker purports to show that the 
condition in question is satisfied by pointing out that in the actual world—
where H is true—Q is false; as noted above, it does follow that ~ (H ⇒ Q), 
but this is not to the point, since what he needs to show is that ~ (H* ⇒ Q). 
And that cannot be demonstrated by means of a parallel strategy: if A were 
to bring it about that P, Q would be true, since P entails Q; hence, in world 
W* both H* and Q are true, a combination of truth values compatible with 
(H* ⇒ Q). So Hasker’s stated reasoning does not establish what he sets out 
to prove.25
What is more, we can show that, given (PAST), the required condition 
~ (H* ⇒ Q) is not true in general. In fact, it is definitely false in just the sort 
of case that matters for Hasker’s purposes, namely the special case in 
which Q is a counterfactual of freedom.26 We are assuming, for the sake of 
argument, the truth of (PAST):
For any counterfactual of freedom (C → X) and any possible world W, 
(C → X) is true in W if and only if [HW ⇒ (C → X)].
We know that Q is true in W* (since A brings it about that P in W*, and P 
entails Q). Let us assume that Q is a counterfactual of freedom; then by 
(PAST), the history of W* entails Q, i.e. (H* ⇒ Q).27 So in this case A brings 
it about that Q is false in W* (since A brings it about that Q is true in a world 
only if that world’s history does not entail Q). And since W* is the nearest 
possible world in which A brings it about that P, we can conclude: if A 
were to bring it about that P, thereby ensuring the truth of Q, A would not 
thereby bring it about that Q, if Q is a counterfactual of freedom.
The upshot of all this is that Hasker’s proof of the power entailment 
principle (4) fails. To summarize, the proof hinges on establishing the fol-
lowing intermediate conclusion:
If P entails Q and Q is false, then the counterfactual conditional if A were 
to bring it about that P, A would thereby bring it about that Q is true.
But as I have just shown, there is a lacuna in Hasker’s argument for this 
conclusion. Furthermore, in the case of interest, where Q is a counterfac-
tual of freedom, it follows directly from (PAST) that no matter what A 
might do, A would not qualify as bringing it about that Q, in Hasker’s sense. 
Therefore Hasker’s argument for the intended intermediate conclusion 
fails, and so his proof of (4) does not go through.
Let us now turn our attention to the inference from
25The argument would go through if H* = H. But, given (PAST), this is not true in general. 
See note 27 below.
26Hasker introduces the power entailment principle (4) in his argument precisely in order 
to instantiate, at step (6), to a case where “Q” is the counterfactual of freedom (C → ~Z).
27This shows that H* = H is not true in general. For as noted above, given the assumptions 
of the proof, H does not entail Q. But as we have just established, H* does entail Q, if Q is a 
counterfactual of freedom. So in this case H and H* have different entailments, and hence 
they are not identical.
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(2) A is in c, and it is in A’s power to refrain from doing z.
to
(3) It is in A’s power to bring it about that: A is in c, and A refrains from 
doing z.
Hasker briefly indicates his justification for this inference in a footnote:
Given (BA) and the fact that A is in c, A’s refraining from doing z simply is 
A’s bringing it about that: A is in c, and A refrains from doing z. It follows 
that A’s power to do the former, is also A’s power to do the latter.28
Now by hypothesis A does not, in fact, refrain from doing z; so “A’s 
refraining from doing z” must be understood as a reference to a counter-
factual scenario. In other words, what Hasker is really saying in the first 
sentence above is: given (BA) and the fact that A is in c, if A were to refrain 
from doing z, A would thereby bring it about that (C & ~Z).
To evaluate this statement, consider a nearby possible world W* in 
which A is in c and A refrains from doing z. Does A, by refraining, bring 
it about that (C & ~Z) in that world? According to (BA), A brings it about 
that (C & ~Z) in W* if and only if, for some X,
(i) A causes it to be the case that X,
(ii) (X & H*) ⇒ (C & ~Z), and
(iii) ~ [H* ⇒ (C & ~Z)],
where “H*” represents the prior history of W*. For present purposes, ~Z 
can serve as our “X.” In refraining from doing z (we may suppose), A 
causes it to be the case that ~Z, so (i) is satisfied. Assuming that the circum-
stances c that A is in just before her “act” of refraining belong to the prior 
history of the world, H* entails C, hence (~Z & H*) ⇒ (C & ~Z), and so (ii) 
is satisfied. What about condition (iii), which says that H* by itself does 
not entail (C & ~Z)? Hasker doesn’t say why he thinks this condition is 
satisfied. Clearly the history H of the actual world does not entail (C & ~Z), 
since ~Z is in fact false. But this is irrelevant, since it is H* and not H that 
matters here.29 And H* does entail (C & ~Z), given (PAST). Here is why: 
in W*, where A refrains from doing z in c, the counterfactual of freedom 
(C → ~Z) is true. By (PAST), then, H* entails (C → ~Z). As just noted in 
connection with (ii), H* also entails C. Taking those results together, H* 
entails (C & ~Z), so that condition (iii) is definitely violated.30 This shows 
28Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 292n4.
29If we were to assume that H* = H, the proof would go through. But that assumption is 
false; given (PAST) we have: H* entails (C & ~Z) but H does not, so H* is not the same as H.
30H* entails both (C → ~Z) and C, so every H* world is one in which both (C → ~Z) and 
C are true. And if both of those are true in a world, then so is ~Z. So every H* world is a ~Z 
world, i.e., H* entails ~Z. 
 Some readers might suppose that it is a problem for Molinists if H* entails ~Z, as this 
means that what is allegedly a free action, A’s refraining from doing z, is entailed by the past 
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that A does not bring it about that (C & ~Z) in W*, or indeed in any world 
in which A refrains from doing z in c. It is therefore just false that “A’s 
refraining from doing z simply is A’s bringing it about that: A is in c, and 
A refrains from doing z.” And Hasker’s justification of the inference from 
(2) to (3), which rests on that statement, fails.
I conclude that Hasker’s derivations of (3) and (4) are flawed, and hence 
his argument for (7) fails to establish that Molinists are committed to this 
half of the intended contradiction. The reason for the failure of the argu-
ment is just as anticipated at the beginning of this section: A has the power 
to bring about the truth of (C → ~Z) and of (C & ~Z) only if it is true that if 
A were to refrain from doing z in c, she would bring about the truth of those 
propositions. However, if A were to refrain from doing z in c, although she 
would thereby ensure the truth of both (C → ~Z) and (C & ~Z), she would 
not bring about the truth of either one. For in that case God would always 
have known that (C → ~Z) was true of her; hence by Hasker’s own lights, 
there would be something in the past history of the world that entails 
(C → ~Z). And that, in conjunction with C (itself a fact about the history of 
the world prior to A’s action), entails (C & ~Z). Since both of the truths in 
question would be entailed by the prior history of the world, A would not, 
by refraining, bring about either of these truths, in Hasker’s sense. Hence 
A’s power to refrain from doing z in c does not amount to a power on her 
part to bring about the truth of (C → ~Z) or of (C & ~Z).
4. Flint to the Rescue?
The problems with Hasker’s proofs for (3) and (4) are serious; but before 
we conclude that they doom his anti-Molinist argument, let us consider a 
hint that Thomas Flint provides about how we might rehabilitate Hasker’s 
argument for (7). Flint affirms that the Molinist is committed to (7), and in 
support of this he specifies a way of understanding the notion of power to 
bring about a state of affairs that makes the case for (7) direct and incontest-
able.31 If we understand “power to bring about” as Flint does, the power 
entailment principle (4) admits of a trivial proof, and (3) is straightfor-
wardly derivable from (2). And in that case any shortcomings in Hasker’s 
history of the world. (It turns out that given (PAST) this is generically true for all human 
actions, in all possible worlds.) But consider that according to Molinism, everything that 
ever happens in the created order is entailed by the combination of God’s middle knowledge 
and his creative decision. Molinists do not regard the fact that all human actions in par-
ticular are entailed by this combination as having any adverse implications for human free 
will; certainly the fact of this entailment does not imply that all human actions are causally 
determined (which the Molinist would regard as incompatible with human free will). It is 
difficult to see why Molinists should change their assessment of the situation if God’s middle 
knowledge and God’s creative decision are classified as belonging to the world’s past history, 
for it seems that this is merely a change in classification and not a substantive modification 
of their views. See the end of section 5 for further discussion of this point.
31Flint, “A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument,” 300. Flint suggests that this construal 
of “power to bring about” follows from (BA). I disagree, for reasons I explain below. The 
construal of “power to bring about” that I think does follow naturally from (BA) is the one I 
tentatively attribute to Hasker in note 33 below.
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own attempts to derive (3) and (4) are irrelevant. Here is the notion of 
“power to bring about” implicit in Flint’s remarks:
(PBA) A has the power to bring it about that Y if and only if: for some X,
(i) A has the power to cause it to be the case that X,
(ii) (X & H) ⇒ Y, and
(iii) ~(H ⇒ Y),
where “H” represents the prior history of the world.
The crucial feature here is that according to (PBA), what A actually has the 
power to bring about is a function of the past history of the actual world;32 
considerations regarding counterfactual scenarios and hence other pos-
sible worlds (and their histories) are irrelevant.
Hasker’s own reasoning about “power to bring about” represents a dif-
ferent approach, insofar as counterfactual scenarios figure centrally in his 
reasoning. His proof of the power entailment principle and his justifica-
tion for the inference from (2) to (3) both involve the following pattern of 
reasoning, where “φ” represents something A does not in fact do:
A has the power to φ.
If A were to φ, A would thereby bring it about that Y.
Therefore, A has the power to bring it about that Y.33
In both proofs, Hasker’s attempt to establish the truth of the relevant coun-
terfactual conditional (“If A were to φ, A would thereby bring it about that 
Y”) is the weak link. For as I have shown, in each case Hasker fails to 
establish that “A brings it about that Y” would be satisfied in the relevant 
counterfactual scenario.
This is where (PBA) could come to the rescue. If we stipulate that (PBA) 
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for “power to bring about,” 
then counterfactual scenarios are irrelevant when determining whether 
32I owe this way of putting the point to Thomas Flint.
33Hasker’s reasoning about “power to bring about” suggests a commitment to the fol-
lowing (to my mind, very reasonable) pair of conditions:
A has the power to bring it about that Y if and only if: for some X,
(a) A has the power to cause it to be the case that X, and
(b) if A were to cause it to be the case that X, A would thereby bring it about that Y.
Unpacking the second condition and retaining the first yields the following (compare with 
(PBA)):
A has the power to bring it about that Y if and only if: for some X,
(i) A has the power to cause it to be the case that X,
(ii) (X & H*) ⇒ Y, and
(iii) ~(H* ⇒ Y),
where “H*” represents the history, prior to its coming to be the case that X, of the nearest 
possible world W* in which A causes it to be the case that X. (That is, H* is the history of the 
world as it would have been if A were to cause it to be the case that X.)
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an agent has the power to bring about a given state of affairs. For example, 
there would no longer be any need for Hasker to show, in his proof of the 
power entailment principle (4), that ~ (H* ⇒ Q), where H* is the history of 
the nearest possible world in which A brings it about that P. Instead, at 
the relevant point in his proof he would need only show that ~ (H ⇒ Q), 
where H is the history of the actual world—and that is easily done, as we 
have seen. I leave it to the reader to confirm that, given (PBA), both the 
power entailment principle (4) and the inference from (2) to (3) admit of 
obvious proofs. Indeed, given (PBA), (7) itself is easily established by a far 
more direct argument than Hasker’s (1)–(7), as Flint shows.34 So why not 
just read (PBA) into Hasker’s argument, and declare that the Molinist’s 
commitment to (7) is beyond question?
The problem with this strategy is that the notion of power to bring about 
a state of affairs, as specified by (PBA), does not coincide with the no-
tion of power to bring about a state of affairs, as specified by (BA). Let 
me frame the point this way: an agent can have the (PBA)-power-to-bring-
it-about that Y, even if the agent does not have in her power any action 
such that were she to perform it, she would thereby (BA)-bring-it-about 
that Y. (This is precisely why it is advantageous to adopt (PBA) in the 
argument for (7).) But unless an agent is able to do something whereby 
she would (BA)-bring-it-about that Y, we cannot reasonably attribute to her 
the power to (BA)-bring-it-about that Y. Therefore: an agent can have the 
(PBA)-power-to-bring-it-about that Y without having the power to (BA)-
bring-it-about that Y, which shows that the two notions do not coincide. 
And so adopting (PBA) in order to make the argument for (7) go through 
amounts to changing the subject in a subtle way. The conclusion of the 
resulting argument would be
(7′) It is in A’s power to bring it about, in the sense of (PBA), that 
(C → ~Z).35
34Flint, “A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument,” 299–300.
35Since Flint employs what I am calling (PBA) in order to show that the Molinist is com-
mitted to (7), what he actually establishes is that the Molinist is committed to (7′), not (7). 
This subtle equivocation undermines one of Flint’s replies to Hasker. See Flint, “Whence and 
Whither the Molinist Debate,” 40–43. In effect, Flint argues that even if the Molinist grants 
(PAST), Hasker’s argument for (9) does not go through. More precisely, Flint argues that a 
Molinist who grants that the counterfactuals of freedom belong to the world’s history has 
grounds for rejecting the assumption
(a) If it’s not possible that A brings it about that X, then it’s not possible that A 
has the power to bring it about that X
on which Hasker’s argument for (9) depends. But Flint’s case against (a) rests explicitly on the 
premise that the Molinist is committed to (7)—a premise that, as I have shown, is undermined 
by (PAST). And if we replace that premise with the similar one that Flint has actually suc-
ceeded in establishing, namely that the Molinist is committed to (7′), Flint’s argument against 
(a) does not go through. (If his argument did go through, it would also serve to undermine 
the similar premise
(4*) If there is no possible world in which A brings it about that (C → X), then it is not 
in A’s power to bring it about that (C → X)
from section 2 of this paper.)
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But (7′), combined with
(9) It is not in A’s power to bring it about, in the sense of (BA), that 
(C → ~Z),
does not yield a genuine contradiction. (Here I have just made explicit the 
sense of “bring about” in the original (9).)
One might hope to eliminate the equivocation by employing (PBA) 
rather than (BA) in the argument for (9), but there seems little chance of 
making this work. What makes the argument for (9) tick is the precise 
way in which (BA) interacts with (PAST); there is no similar interaction 
between (PBA) and (PAST) that an argument for the negation of (7′) might 
exploit. I conclude that the need for the sort of counterfactual reasoning 
that Hasker employs when arguing in support of steps (3) and (4) cannot 
simply be sidestepped by recasting the argument in terms of (PBA), since 
that maneuver would be fatal to the intended reductio. And so my objec-
tions to (3) and (4) cannot be dismissed in this way.
5. Middle Knowledge and the World’s History: What’s Really at Stake
I have shown that if the counterfactuals of freedom are entailed by the past 
history of the world—that is, if (PAST) is true—then Hasker’s argument 
that the Molinist is committed to (7) fails. On the other hand, if (PAST) is 
false, then Hasker’s argument that the Molinist is committed to (9) col-
lapses. Either way, Hasker fails to show that the Molinist is committed to 
both halves, (7) and (9), of the intended contradiction.
Although Hasker’s stated case against Molinism does not go through, 
it would not be entirely satisfactory to conclude this discussion without 
addressing the conceptual concerns that motivate his argument. Hasker 
thinks that because God’s middle knowledge has already made a differ-
ence to the world’s causal history, by informing God’s creative decision, 
this middle knowledge must be counted as part of the settled past his-
tory of the world. This means, in particular, that God’s knowledge of the 
counterfactuals of freedom about me is part of the world’s past history 
and hence unalterable. That may seem difficult to reconcile with the Molin-
ist’s convictions (i) that I sometimes act freely, (ii) that when I act freely, 
it is in my power do otherwise (in the same circumstances), and (iii) that 
were I to do otherwise, a true counterfactual of freedom about me would 
be false, and God would never have known a counterfactual of freedom 
about me that he has in fact always known. Supposing that God’s middle 
knowledge does genuinely and strictly belong to the world’s past history, 
these three Molinist convictions entail that I have the power to act in such 
a way that the past history of the world would have been otherwise. To be 
more precise, these Molinist convictions entail that
(POW) It is in my power to act in such a way that were I so to act, the 
past history of the world would have been different from the 
actual past, in that God never would have known a particular 
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counterfactual of freedom about me which he has in fact always 
known.
Hasker’s concern seems to be that insofar as Molinists really are com-
mitted to (POW) or something like it, their position is shown to be absurd. 
Why? The reasons that Hasker and others tend to give cluster around 
three related objections:
1. (POW) implies a denial of the evident truth that the past is fixed and 
unalterable.
2. (POW) implies that I have an absurd or objectionable sort of power 
over the past.
3. (POW) is incompatible with the libertarianism that Molinists pro-
fess.
I contend that all three of these objections are misguided; I will explain 
this assessment for each one in turn. Once again, I will assume that God’s 
middle knowledge is part of the world’s past history, strictly speaking, 
since (POW) and the three objections to it depend on this assumption.
First, does (POW) imply a denial of the evident truth that the past is 
fixed and unalterable, as objection 1 asserts? Certainly not. The past is unal-
terable, without a doubt. After all, a genuine alteration of the past is strictly 
impossible; there is no possible world in which an event or state of affairs 
that was once part of the world’s past history is subsequently not part of 
the world’s past history. But precisely because it is strictly impossible that 
the past should undergo any alteration, we may conclude that the past 
is unalterable, and would be unalterable, no matter what actions I might 
perform, and no matter what actions I might have in my power.
In particular, to say of a given action that were I now to perform it, the 
past history of the world would be different from the actual past is to contrast an 
actual and a counterfactual scenario—that is, to contrast the history of the 
actual world (in which I do not perform the specified action) with that of 
a different possible world (in which I do perform it). To describe an action 
in such terms does not imply that my performing the action would effect 
a transition from the one situation or history to the other (that is, a change 
within a single world from one to the other). In fact, it is clear that I would 
not alter the past were I to perform an action of the given description; in 
that counterfactual scenario the world’s past history would be just as fixed 
and unchanging as in the actual world. Hence there is no reason at all to 
think that my having the power to perform such an action implies that the 
past admits of alteration or that I am capable of altering it. I conclude that 
a commitment to (POW) in no way implies that the past is anything but 
fixed and unalterable, and that objection 1 is misplaced.
Second, does (POW) imply that I have an objectionable sort of power 
over the past, as objection 2 asserts? No; in fact it does not imply that I 
have any genuine power over the past at all. Consider that in the actual 
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world, I exercise no power over the past. The history of the world prior 
to my existence, which includes God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals 
of freedom about me, was settled before I ever existed, and I do not influ-
ence that prior history by my actions. (This is particularly evident in the 
case of God’s middle knowledge; that knowledge is logically prior even to 
God’s decision to create me, and so it is clearly not influenced by what I 
do.) Because I do not influence the past by my actions, we may conclude 
that my power to perform the actions I do in fact perform does not amount to 
power over the past on my part. But now notice that something similar can 
be said for the power that (POW) attributes to me—the power to act in 
such a way that were I so to act, God’s middle knowledge and hence the 
world’s past history would have been different. If I were to exercise the 
power in question, would I thereby influence the past? No, for in that 
counterfactual scenario, just as in the actual world, the prior history of 
the world (including God’s middle knowledge) would have been settled 
before I ever arrived on the scene, and my actions would not influence 
that prior history. It follows that even if I were to exercise the power that 
(POW) attributes to me, I would not thereby influence the past; hence the 
power that (POW) attributes to me cannot rightly be called power over the 
past. Thus objection 2 is mistaken.
Hasker himself has formulated a line of argument that is similar to 
objection 2, in the context of the problem of free will and divine foreknowl-
edge. He argues that so-called “counterfactual power over the past,”36 like 
that which (POW) attributes to me, would imply power on my part to 
bring about the past.37 The idea is that even if “counterfactual power” over 
God’s past knowledge is not objectionable in its own right, it implies a 
further sort of power over the past that is objectionable. But his argument 
that “counterfactual power” over the past implies a genuine power to bring 
about the past rests on the power entailment principle (4)—which he af-
firms on basis of the very proof I have already shown to be flawed.
Finally, I turn to objection 3, which asserts that the power that (POW) 
attributes to me, the power to act in such a way that something in the past 
history of the world would be otherwise, is incompatible with libertari-
anism. Why are these supposed to be incompatible? Well, (POW) sounds 
exactly like the sort of thing that compatibilists are apt to say in response to 
the Consequence Argument:
It is in my power to act in such a way that were I so to act, the past his-
tory of the world would have been different from the actual past.
36“Counterfactual power over the past” is just shorthand for “power to perform an ac-
tion such that, were I to perform it, the past would have been different”—and as I have 
pointed out above, this does not amount to power over the past at all, properly speaking. 
Hasker himself notes that “‘counterfactual power’ with respect to some state of affairs 
need not involve power over that state of affairs at all” (Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 
101).
37Hasker, “Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom,” 46.
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If a textbook compatibilist line like this is a consequence of Molinism, it 
might be tempting to conclude that Molinists cannot consistently main-
tain their libertarian credentials.
But that conclusion would be too hasty. Just consider how starkly dif-
ferent the contexts are in which compatibilists and Molinists will affirm 
the above “compatibilist line.” Compatibilists are apt to assert it when 
responding to the Consequence Argument—which is to say, precisely in 
the context of an assumption that determinism is true. In that context, the 
compatibilist line really is an expression of compatibilism, since to assert 
it in that context is to say that I have the power to do something other than 
what I will in fact do, even supposing that determinism is true. Molinists, by 
contrast, will affirm the compatibilist line only on the supposition that my 
actions are not causally determined. Given that assumption, the line has no 
compatibilist implications. Hence the idea that the Molinist’s affirmation 
of it is inconsistent with libertarianism is unfounded.
It might be replied that even if (POW) is not flatly inconsistent with 
libertarianism, there is at least a serious tension here; insofar as they are 
committed to (POW), Molinists cannot endorse an argument to which 
libertarians are wont to appeal as the grounds for their incompatibilism, 
namely, the Consequence Argument.38 For if they accept (POW), Molinists 
must reject the general principle no one has the power to perform an action 
such that, were he to perform it, the remote past would have been otherwise. And 
this principle is a premise (or it underwrites a premise) in typical formula-
tions of the Consequence Argument.
Should it cause Molinists any anxiety to reject the principle in question? 
Hardly. Molinists are incompatibilists; they accept the conclusion of the 
Consequence Argument. But they should endorse this particular argu-
ment for that conclusion only if there are good reasons for affirming all of 
its premises. If one of these premises is a principle to the effect that no one 
has the power to perform an action such that, were he to perform it, the re-
mote past would have been otherwise, then the question is: are there good 
reasons for affirming that principle? I don’t think there are. There are good 
reasons for denying that I can affect or alter anything in the remote past. And 
there are good reasons for denying that I have any kind of genuine power 
over events in the remote past. But I see no basis for supposing that those 
reasons support the principle in question. Defenders of such a principle 
are apt to characterize it as “a statement of the familiar principle that no 
one can change the past”39 or as “capturing the intuitive idea that the past 
is fixed.”40 Indeed, it is typically on the basis of just such characterizations 
that a principle like the one in question is held up as obviously true or as 
rationally defensible. But as I have already explained in my responses to 
objections 1 and 2, the sort of power at issue—power to perform an action 
38See Perszyk, “Molinism and the Consequence Argument.”
39van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 92.
40Fischer, “Foreknowledge, Freedom and the Fixity of the Past,” 464.
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such that, were I to perform it, something in the remote past would have 
been otherwise—is not rightly characterized as genuine power over the 
past, and the assertion that I have such power does not imply a denial of 
the evident truth that the past is fixed and unalterable. So the characteriza-
tions on the basis of which the principle in question is typically affirmed 
are in fact mischaracterizations. Quite apart from Molinism, then, there is 
some reason for thinking that the principle in question is unfounded, that 
(at least insofar as it relies on this principle) the Consequence Argument is 
on shaky ground, and hence that incompatibilists ought not to regard that 
argument as the basis for their incompatibilism.
This brings to an end my response to the three objections against (POW). 
For all their surface plausibility, all three turn out upon closer examination 
to be misplaced. As far as I can see, there are no grounds for regarding 
(POW) as a serious liability for Molinism.
There is still one additional consideration that might seem to call into 
question the Molinist’s libertarian credentials. It can be stated quite simply: 
according to Molinists, God’s middle knowledge and God’s complete cre-
ative act taken together entail every fact about the complete history of the 
created universe, past, present, and future. If God’s complete creative act 
and his middle knowledge belong to the world’s past history, as Hasker 
contends, then the past history of the world entails the entire future history of 
the created universe, including every fact about what any created agent will ever 
do.41 That is to say, the (unalterable) past history of the world entails a 
unique future. But this is incompatible with libertarianism—so the argu-
ment goes—because it is an essential commitment of libertarianism that 
for at least some actions that I perform, the prior history of the world nei-
ther entails that I will, nor that I will not perform the action.
41It follows that no one ever brings about the truth of any fact at all, in Hasker’s stipulated 
sense of “bring about”—even if agents freely cause all sorts of things. (Recall that according 
to Hasker’s definition, “A brings it about that Y” is true only if the world’s past history by 
itself does not entail Y.) This observation provides a quick and simple way to show that 
Hasker’s argument for (7) fails. If we suppose that God’s complete creative act and his middle 
knowledge belong to the world’s past history in all possible worlds, as Hasker’s argument 
for (9) requires, then no agent ever brings about any facts at all, in any possible world. It 
follows that no agent has the power to bring about any state of affairs at all, in any possible 
world, regardless of what actions the agent has the power to perform (since no one has the 
power to bring about a given state of affairs unless there is a possible action on her part by 
which, were she to perform it, she would bring about the state of affairs in question—again, 
something Hasker’s argument for (9) requires). But if no one has the power to bring about 
any state of affairs at all, no matter what actions one has the power to perform, then Hasker’s 
inference from
(2) A is in c, and it is in A’s power to refrain from doing z
to
(3) It is in A’s power to bring it about that: A is in c, and A refrains from doing z
is invalid. Since “it is in A’s power to bring it about that P” is necessarily false, the power 
entailment principle
(4) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and ‘P’ entails ‘Q’ and ‘Q’ is false, 
then it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q
is true, but only in the trivial sense that it has a necessarily false antecedent (and consequent).
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Here we have as simple and direct an argument as could be desired 
for the very thing that Hasker says his own “bring about” argument is 
intended to establish—namely, that “if we assume the existence of CCFs 
[counterfactuals of creaturely freedom], we can derive the result that the 
agents in question are not free (in the libertarian sense).”42 But I think this 
simple argument is mistaken on a crucial point. So far as I can see, it is not 
an essential commitment of libertarianism that, for some of my actions, 
the prior history of the world neither entails that I will nor that I will not 
perform that action. What is an essential commitment of libertarianism 
is that at least some of my actions are not causally determined by events 
or factors that are not under my causal control. (Libertarians share with 
other incompatibilists the conviction that if some action of mine is caus-
ally determined, then it is not in my power to do otherwise; they also hold 
that, on at least some occasions, it is in my power to do otherwise, i.e., to 
do something other than what I actually do on that occasion.) The differ-
ence is significant, because even if the world’s past history entails that I 
will perform a given action on a given occasion, it does not follow that 
my action is causally determined.43 Hence a libertarian may accept the fol-
lowing: the past history of the world entails that I will perform a specific 
action on a specific occasion, and yet I have it in my power to do otherwise 
on that very occasion. The rational Molinist who grants that God’s middle 
knowledge and God’s creative act really do belong to the world’s past his-
tory will say exactly this about every free action I ever perform.
In fact, the theory of middle knowledge provides a nice illustration 
of the point that entailment by the past does not imply that an action is 
causally determined. Suppose God knows that as a result of his complete 
creative act and the contributions prior to time t of indeterministic created 
causes (including me), I will be in circumstances c at t. Suppose further 
that God knows that the counterfactual of freedom (C → Z) is true of 
me. Then, given Molinist principles: (i) God’s middle knowledge and his 
complete creative act, both of which (we are supposing) are part of the 
world’s past history, entail that I will do z, and that I will do it freely; (ii) 
my doing z is not causally determined—by God’s middle knowledge and 
his creative act or by anything else; and (iii) I have the power not to do 
z, on that very occasion and in the very same circumstances c.44 Hasker 
42Hasker, “Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom,” 51.
43If some definition of causal determinism should have the consequence causal determinism 
is true if the past history of the world by itself entails a unique future, then that definition is 
absurd; for on such a definition, causal determinism could be true even in a world where 
the laws of nature are indeterministic as you please, and indeed even if there are no laws of 
nature at all.
44Note that God’s middle knowledge is not part of the circumstances that figure in the 
counterfactuals of freedom as Molinists think of them. And this seems intuitively right—a 
bit of divine knowledge that is (logically) prior to God’s creative act is not in any meaningful 
sense part of the situation that I find myself in. No matter what guiding role a bit of divine 
knowledge may have played in God’s decision to contribute causally to my being in a par-
ticular situation, that bit of knowledge does not itself comprise part of my situation.
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seems to think that (iii) is untenable; he seems to think that if God knows 
that I would do z in c, then when I find myself in c, I must be unable to do 
otherwise. But he does not explain how God’s knowledge of what I would 
do in those circumstances is supposed to impose or imply such a limita-
tion on my abilities.
I realize that many libertarians would be dissatisfied with the position 
that I am suggesting the Molinist could rationally adopt. Many libertar-
ians—including Hasker—would insist that, if I really do have the power 
to do otherwise, then it must be true not only that my doing z is not 
causally determined, but also that the prior history of the world does not 
entail (logically) that I will do z. This additional requirement is for many 
libertarians a deeply-held conviction about free will. But it is not clear 
why a requirement to this effect should be thought to be a sine qua non 
of libertarianism, as opposed to being an additional commitment that, 
although shared by many libertarians, is not essential to libertarianism 
as such. Furthermore, it is not clear just what the grounds for the require-
ment are supposed to be. Suppose the past history of the world entails that 
I will do z; it follows, of course, that I will not do otherwise. But why think 
that it follows, in addition, that I lack the power to do otherwise?
Obviously the issues here are complex, and this is not the place for a 
thorough treatment of them. I will simply point out that the Molinist posi-
tion I have described seems to be perfectly consistent. Some libertarians 
will regard it as unsatisfactory by their own lights. But I see no reason 
to think that the position is inconsistent with the essential core of liber-
tarianism, which is that human beings have free will—that is to say, they 
sometimes have both the power to perform a given action and the power 
not to perform it—and that an agent can have such two-way power with 
respect to a given action only if his action is not causally determined. It 
seems to me that a libertarian may consistently and reasonably hold that 
even if facts that are genuinely and strictly part of the world’s past history 
entail that I will perform a given action, it does not follow that my action is 
causally determined or that I lack the power to do otherwise. Hence even if 
it follows from Molinism that God’s complete creative act and his middle 
knowledge belong to the world’s past history, and hence that the world’s 
past history entails a unique future, this does not by itself invalidate the 
Molinist’s libertarian credentials.
6. Conclusion
My primary aim in this paper has been to show that the “bring about” 
contradiction that Hasker tries to pin on the Molinist does not materi-
alize, whether God’s middle knowledge belongs to the past history of the 
world or not. If God’s middle knowledge is part of the world’s history, 
then Hasker’s argument that we created free agents have the power to bring 
about the counterfactuals of freedom about ourselves fails, as I have shown. On 
the other hand, if God’s middle knowledge is not part of the world’s past 
history, then Hasker’s argument that we do not have the power to bring about 
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the counterfactuals of freedom about ourselves never gets off the ground, by 
his own admission. Either way, the intended contradiction does not arise 
for the Molinist. Hence, Hasker’s attempt to provide a rigorous reductio of 
Molinism does not succeed.
I will close with a suggestion. In discussions of freedom and fore-
knowledge, philosophers have frequently taken it for granted that if 
the unalterable past history of the world entails a unique future, then 
libertarianism is false. It seems to me that the same assumption about 
what “libertarian free will” requires is at least lurking around the edges 
of Hasker’s “bring about” arguments against Molinism. I think that this 
assumption is where the real philosophical meat of these issues lies, and 
that consequently philosophers who wish to make headway on these 
issues would do well to bring this assumption to the fore—and to articu-
late and evaluate reasons for and against it. In particular, philosophers 
(including libertarians) should critically evaluate this assumption in the 
light of the doctrine of divine foreknowledge and the Molinist theory 
of middle knowledge. It would not be surprising if a broad assumption 
about free will and “the past history of the world,” an assumption that 
may seem evident enough in contexts where it is really the past history of 
the physical universe and its causal bearing on our future actions that we 
have in mind, should turn out not to be quite so evident in the context 
of theological doctrines about divine knowledge and its logical relation to 
our actions. The point is this: debates about free will and divine fore-
knowledge, and about free will and Molinism, provide opportunities 
for philosophers to critically reexamine and refine their ideas about the 
nature of free will—not just to deploy predetermined and inflexible 
commitments. Therefore, when they approach these theological issues, 
philosophers ought not simply to assume that principles that libertarians 
are apt to affirm in the context of discussions of free will and causal de-
terminism are non-negotiable elements of a libertarian position on free 
will; that would be missing an opportunity to let work in philosophical 
theology inform and guide our views about just what principles libertar-
ians should, or must, accept.45
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